Thursday, January 8, 2015

BitStamp Theft Bitcoins Being Spent

The BitStamp Theft coins are more than on the move, they are being spent or being prepared for spending. The controller of the 1L2Js address has a problem, since the vast majority of the bitcoins that were stolen have been placed into a single address. Anyone who looks at addresses would clearly be able to see that those coins were stolen. And any regulated exchange is supposed to engage in these pattern matching practices, so if they want Dollars or Euros then they need to do some gymnastics.

Up until block number 338060 the presumed theft address 1L2JsXHPMYuAa9ugvHGLwkdstCPUDemNCf has kept it's output coins in a closed system. By closed system I mean that if you trace all input coins repeatedly every coin would pass through a 1L2Js address eventually.  The first address to break the pattern is 15wsXq5uSe2aT5BssLvQehUAQVn525RH25.  First we need to be careful of false positives, to make sure we are not just reporting someone tagging an involved address with 666 bits.  So here is the "heratige" of the 15wsX coins:

The very top transaction, 8328a2 contains 13 inputs from the 1L2Js address associated with the theft.  The gathered amounts are then peeled off until we have two 1BTC amounts in the 15wsX address.

Quick sidebar: note that even though the entire source of the BTC can be traced back to the hack, we cannot presume the controller of 15wsX is the same as the controller of the theft coins.  It is very easy for each of those peel chain steps to be the deposit to another party willing to buy hot bitcoins. There were 5 places in this chain where it could have happened, so it is a possibility that cannot be dismissed.

This part of the chain is where the external linkage happens.  For clarity I will only show the 930ae0 transaction, but the b52316 is functionally identical.
This transaction is either a simple coinjoin or it is a transaction deliberately structured to look like a coinjoin.  On the left we have one BTC in and one BTC out.  On the right we have some loose change in and 100 bits less out.  If you look at the transaction (here it is on blocktrail) you will see that 100 bits was the transaction fee paid.  Both sides of these transactions could very easily be their own transaction, so we cannot presume that the transaction is a single party transaction. This little bit of loose change washing continues to wash other amounts for quite some time (all the yellow transactions follow this pattern).
The exact same pattern is seen for the other transaction as well.  My conclusion is that the loose change address is intended to "wash" the bitcoins by spreading the taint of their source around.  However since the wash amount is less than the output amount then at least some of the BTC in the 1HRv8 address had to have come from the previous address, removing the plausible deniability.  This isn't the best washing job I've seen.

This may be a transaction only designed to test the waters for identification, but I think it is safe to say the thief intends to sell or spend the proceeds of the theft, if they haven't done so already.

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